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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION AND CHOICE OF LAW
By

A. HOGAN, JR.*
"In the case of local law, since each of the states of the Union has
constitutional authority to make its own law with respect to persons and
events within its borders, the full faith and credit clause does not ordinarily
require it to substitute for its own law the conflicting law of another state,
even though that law is of controlling force in the courts of the state with
respect to the same persons and events."'
EDWARD

A sovereign state of the United States is subject to the benevolent
despotism of the Federal Constitution. 2 In the performance of official functions, limits are placed upon a state's freedom of choice. Ie equality of a
sister state and the dignity of a citizen of the United States are secured
by simple provisions of Article IV and Amendment XIV of the United
States Constitution. "Full Faith and Credit," "Privileges and Immunities,"
"Due Process" are magic words which make cooperation as important to the
nation as autonomy once was thought to be indispensable to the sovereignty
of a state.
The mysterious subject of Conflict of Laws has been disciplined by the
substitution of compulsion for comity under the provisions of the Federal
Constitution. Choice of law which once was a matter of concern only to the
Supreme Court of a state has now become a federal problem subject to
judicial review in the Supreme Court of the United States.' Full faith and
credit to judgments which override local public policy has become an
acceptable practice, although one which the Supreme Court will compel,
when necessary.4 More difficult, and not so readily acceptable, is full faith
and credit for a statute of a sister stateYs
The failure to include "Acts" in the original statute implementing the
Full Faith and Credit Clause has now been corrected. 6 The difficulties
inherent in a requirement of full faith and credit for statutes of a
sister state have been revealed in litigation prior and subsequent to the
amendment of the implementing statute. Workmen's compensation statutes
have provoked the litigation." Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California' presents a critical and typical problem. A, a
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.

Chief Justice Stone, in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the

Constitution,45 COL. L. R. 1 (1945).
'New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1948).
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
'Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933);
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
'294 U.S. 532 (1950).
(268)
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workmlan, makes a contract of employment with B, a corporation, in California, the performance of which is to be given in Alaska. Injury occurs in
Alaska. The compensation acts, both of California and Alaska, provide that
the remedy therein given is exclusive and employment under such statutes
constitutes an acceptance of the benefits to the exclusion of other legal
remedies against the employer. The benefits under the California act provide
more money.
The injured employee makes his claim and is given an award under the
California statute. The employer objects to the California award on the
grounds that full faith and credit is denied to the statute of Alaska. The
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the right of California to make
a choice of law that is reasonable, and with the contacts of employment within
the state and a return to the state after employment as well as the risk that an
injured employee may thereafter be a public charge, the choice of California
law as the proper law was sustained. As to the charge of a failure to give
full faith and credit to the law of Alaska, the court reasoned that to require
California to adopt the Alaska statute would require California to abandon
its own statute, which was a relevant statute. A requirement that the forum
abandon its own relevant statute would make the foreign law superior to the
local law. The purpose of the full faith and credit clause, as the court
observed, is to prevent discrimination against the statute of a sister state
by another forum, not to make the sister state law superior to that of the
forum. Thus, the accommodation of competing systems of law to the
solution of a multi-state problem must be resolved by the forum on a reasonable choice of law. The use of full faith and credit for statutes no longer
has the absolute quality employed in the enforcement of a judgment, under
article IV, section 1, but.now must be re-reviewed in terms of due process,
as to whether there is an arbitrary taking of liberty. of property through the
arbitrary application of an improper or irrelevant law.
Troublesome workmen's compensation cases are becoming numerous.
The maze through which the lawyer must go to learn how a compensation
case will be handled, with constitutional complications added, has many
new turns and the risk of becoming lost has increased. The Supreme Court
of the United States in the October 1954 term decided a case which makes
it appropriate to draw a map, if for no other purpose than to find out where
the maze begins. An analysis of the decision, Carrollv. Lanza,9 reveals that
Mr. Justice Douglas concluded, for the majority, that Arkansas, the place of
injury as well as the forum, was free to permit an employee of a subcontractor to recover for his industrial injury from a general contractor
under the local tort law. Due process was his test. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
349 U.S. 408 (1955).
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for the dissent, concluded that the Supreme Court could not decide the
case until a finding was made as to whether the general contractor was
included as an "employer" within the meaning of the Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Act where the claimant had recovery against his employer, a
subcontractor. Missouri was the place of principal employment between
the claimant and the subcontractor and the duty in Arkansas was temporary.
Full faith and credit is his test. Arkansas had a workmen's compensation
statute.
As a result of what appears to be a confusion in the minds of the justices
as to the premises from which they reason out the solution of this problem,
a restatement of prior conclusions becomes necessary. In a case involving
competing compensation statutes of two states, the restriction becomes solely
one of due process under the 14th amendment, according to Alaska Packers.
In a competition between the common-law policies of the forum and a relevant compensation statute of a sister state, full faith and credit may force
the forum to choose the statutory law, according to Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper.'" The law of conflict of laws with its traditional free choice
of proper law by the forum may be going into discard in the way of the
Laws of Draco and the Institutes of Justinian.
The law of Conflict of Laws has had an ancient and honorable history.
The names of Story, Beale, Goodrich and Lorenzen suggest the giants in the
field." Their efforts to explain it are heroic. Professor Lorenzen, at the age
of 60, thought he had satisfactorily explained its processes in his article
"The Qualification, Classification, or CharacterizationProblem in the Conflict of Laws."' 2 Ten years later he told his students at the Hastings College of
Law that he planned to recast his views along lines which, after much
reflection, he thought to be more nearly correct. Except for some thoughts
expressed in class, which found their way into student notes with all the
risk of error therein contained, his span of life proved too short for the
task. The author of this article will attempt to analyze the problem of the
Lanza case with the techniques remembered by a few students as the ones
thought proper by Professor Lorenzen."3
Briefly, there are five points of reference in his formula for analysis.
1. Primary characterization.This is to be done by locating the problem in
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
(8th ed. 1883) ; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) ; GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (3rd ed. 1949) ; LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1947).
12 50 YALE L. J. 743 (1941).
" Most of the techniques were referred to in the article in note 12 supra, but innovations
probably never Will be verified. Professor Lorenzen stated that he became dissatisfied with his
over-all presentation of his views. These notes are offered with apologies for the failure to document
all of them, and if experts will say that Professor Lorenzen would never approve, there is no one
1"

" STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS

to dispute them.
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one of the broad categories of the law used by the forum such as Torts,
Contracts, Negotiable Instruments or Workmen's Compensation, etc. 4 2.
Choice of connecting factor.This is the logical and legal basis for identifying
the problem with the law of a particular jurisdiction, for example: if the
primary characterization is Torts, the normal connecting factor is Place of
Injury; if Negotiable Instruments, and the problem is one of Negotiability,
Place of Performance may be the connecting factor.'0 3. Statement of the
relevant law of the jurisdiction so selected. A finding and a statement is
required of the law of the jurisdiction so selected. The term relevant foreign
law"0 is used to exclude what may be called the procedural law of the locussince the only foreign law copied or adopted by the forum for the solution
of a conflict of laws problem is the substantive law. Distinguishing between
substance and procedure, to filter out foreign procedure, is called secondary
characterization. A forum remains free to use its own procedure. 4. Application of the rule of law so stated in point 3 to the facts of the case which will
produce a holding by the court that is only tentative. 5. A review of the tentative holding reached under point 4 in the light of the public policy of the
forum. The public policy of the forum includes the provisions of the federal
constitution because, of course, the federal constitution is part of the law of
each state under the provisions of article VI, the supremacy clause, of the
federal constitution. If giving effect to the tentative holding would violate
the public policy of the forum, the forum is free, under accepted principles
of international law, to reject the application of the relevant foreign law.'"
The basic premise on which the Lorenzen approach is founded is that
the forum will characterize a legal problem by its internal law, e.g., whether
a problem is to be called one of contracts or torts when it arises out of an
injury suffered by a passenger on a common carrier is to be determined by
the internal or local law of the forum and not by the law of the place
where the passenger suffered the injury when that occurred in a different
legal jurisdiction.
What does the forum do with a legal problem of the same kind when the
problem involves a matter which is purely local, i.e., when a native daughter
is injured on a locally owned, urban cable car negligently operated by a
native son? If the forum characterizes this problem as a Tort, Lorenzen
expects that the same characterization will be used when the man without a
country is injured due to the negligence of a Nevada engineer crossing the
" See note 12 supra,at 743.
"
'6

See note 12 supra,at 744, 745, 750.
See note 12 supra,at 744.

1T

These are matters which Professor Lorenzen gave only incidental treatment in the article
referred
to in note 12 supra.
8

' Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon Y Austria, 1 K.B. 140 (1935) ; Ciampittiello

v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947) ; See Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political
Crisis in Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L. J. 1027 (1940).
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Great Salt Lake in Utah on a transcontinental train which the injured man
boarded in Illinois after purchasing his ticket in New York. If the injured
man brings suit in California, the California court will characterize his
problem as a tort problem, if that is what it has done for the native daughter.
After Lorenzen has agreed that the forum, the California court, will
say that the man without a country and the native daughter each has a right
to pursue a remedy in the broad category of the law known as Tort, will
their rights be determined by the same law of Torts? The answer, ordinarily,
is no. The suit of one of the parties, the native daughter, will be determined
by local law. The rights of the other will be determined by the law of Conflict
of Laws. The multi-state contacts of the second illustration compels the
distinction. 9
Normally, it would seem proper to inquire at the outset as to why the
court of the forum uses one body of law instead of another for the solution
of a problem. Local law and Conflict of Laws, both part of the jurisprudence
of the forum, often are. opposed to each other in content. As is so often true,
the obvious is the least often seen and simple problems become complicated
because they are not seen. In Lanza, A, an employee of B, a subcontractor,
sued C, a general contractor, for injuries suffered in the course and scope
of his employment in Arkansas. A's contract of employment with B was
made in Missouri and his principal duties were there performed. C's contract
with B was not made in Missouri. The forum was Arkansas. The majority
of the United States Supreme Court held that Arkansas local law was the
proper law. The dissent puts its emphasis on the law of Missouri as the one
probably binding on the forum under the law of Conflict of Laws. The basic
difference between the majority and the dissent in Lanza comes from the
fact that the majority considers the problem one to be governed by local
law free of all foreign law2" and the dissent believes that the problem belongs
in the field of Conflict of Laws. 2 ' To the dissenters, the use of the local
law of the forum to the exclusion of all foreign law is a possible violation
of full faith and credit. To the disinterested but moderately informed
spectator the application of the local law and the rejection of the foreign
law also raises a problem of due process under the 14th amendment.
The first step in the Lorenzen formula has been described as "Primary
Characterization." This is the point at which the forum decides into what
broad category of the law the problem must be placed. The assumption of
Lorenzen is that the problem to be solved is one which belongs to Conflict
of Laws. Such was the assumption of the dissenting judges in Lanza. The
19

Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: .4 Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TULANE L. R. 4
(1944) ; Slater v. Mexican National R. Company, 194 U.S. 120 (1904) ; Cuba Ry. Co. v. Crosby,
222 U.S. 473 (1912).
20 349 U.S. 408, 413.
"Id. at 420.
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distinction between local law and Conflict of Laws is not so easily drawn
as once it was. Our people are migratory, our workers are migratory
and our problems in compensation cases are as complex as those of the
migratory birds for whom the constitution offered no salvation from
competing state action until the fullness of the treaty power was recognized by the Supreme Court.2 2 Workmen's compensation acts no longer
know territorial limits because state legislatures have the authority under
their police power to protect their citizens when those citizens go abroad
in the scope and course of their master's employment.2 3 Overlapping
protection is the order of the day. There being no express legislative
prohibition, an injured workman may take recovery under the law of one
state and subsequently go to another state under whose protection he stands
and collect the higher benefits of the second statute, giving credit for
benefits already received.2 4 Only if an award made under a Workmen's Compensaton Act is uncompromisingly final, will the full faith and credit
clause prevent a second recovery from the same employer.2 5 Thus, the
time has come, at least in the field of workmen's compensation, to settle
at the outset the question of whether the problem presented is local.
When, as was previously held, facts showed a problem to have multistate contacts, the forum was required to reject local law and to employ
Conflict of Laws for the solution of the problem. Lines were more clearly
drawn in those cases where the legal transactions in question had definite
contacts that identified them with one state more than another. If a contract
of insurance is made in New York, between a resident of New York and a
corporation doing business in New York, there is no basis for the application
of the law of Texas (which favors the plaintiff over the defendant) to the
question of the validity of the contract. A plaintiff, moving to Texas some
years later, may use a court of Texas to litigate the question but the court
of Texas has no right to apply the substantive law of Texas to solve the
problem. The use of the substantive law of Texas, on these facts, constitutes
arbitrary conduct,2" through the application of a non-relevant law which
takes away from the defendant rights secured to him under the relevant law
of the place of contract.
Workmen's compensation is a category of the-law which has about it
aspects of contract law, tort law, the police power without territorial limits
being imposed upon its use, and insurance. It is, therefore, a legal novelty
" Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
28 See notes 7 and 8 supra. Also, Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947)
"Industal Conmission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) A and B had agreed
that payment made in the first state was given in partial satisfaction of the full claim.
"'Magnolia Petroleum Co, v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) An unqualified award made in the
first state
is res judicata and a bar to a subsequent claim in a second state.
28
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S..178 (1936), See also Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, (1930) ; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)
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and the observable judicial differences are normal in a subject so anomalous.
If two jurisdictions have similar workmen's compensation laws and the two
jurisdictions have substantial legal contacts with the subject of the litigation,
the use of full faith and credit becomes an impossibility under the doctrine of
Alaska Packers because neither state is duty bound to yield to the other.
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,2 7 likewise shows that in a conflict between two exclusive workmen's compensation
acts, the forum, California, will be free to apply its act although the employee
injured in California was only temporarily in that jurisdiction while performing duties for his Massachusetts employer. In the Lanza case Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, said of PacificEmployers:
"But the Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case teaches that in these
personal injury cases the State where the injury occurs needs not be a vassal
to the home state and allow only that remedy which the home state has
marked as the exclusive
one. The State of the forum also has interests to
'28
serve and to protect."
Will the legal reaction be different when injury comes to an employee
of a subcontractor if there is an additional possible party defendant, such
as a general contractor, who may be sued in the forum in tort?
That the plaintiff, A, has a right to sue C in tort when A, an employee,
of B, a subcontractor, is injured while B's company is performing under a
contract with C, a general contractor, was determined by the majority of the
Supreme Court in Lanza. A and B entered into the relationship of employeeemployer in Missouri. The injury was suffered in Arkansas. A was covered
by workmen's compensation through employment by B both outside his home
state and in Missouri under the Missouri Act. A was covered in Arkansas
under the Arkansas Act by B. The forum for the suit of A versus C was
Arkansas.
In a claim made by A against B, under the law of either state, an
award made by the forum under its own law, would not be upset by the
United States Supreme Court under the full faith and credit clause.2 9 The
precise question before the court in Lanza was whether there is the same
freedom to choose the proper law when a suit is brought by A against C.
Payments had been made under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Missouri where a claim was made by A versus B. B did not resist payment
of the claim to A and there was not, therefore, a formal award.3" Had there
been a formal award, Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt holds that A could not
27

306 U.S. 493 (1939).

349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955).
See notes 5 and 8 supra.
80 The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act requires formal adjudication only "in the event
a dispute arises between the employer and the employee regarding the payment of compensation.
. . ." Mo. REV. STAT., §§ 287.400, 287.450 (1949). Cf. McCartin, note 24 supra. Payment was made
under an agreement, without controversy.
28
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thereafter make a claim against B in Arkansas. The language used by
Mr. Chief Justice Stone:
"... when the employee who has recovered compensation for his injury
in one state seeks a second recovery in another he may be met by the plea
that full faith and credit requires that his demand, which has become res
judicata in one state, must be recognized as such in every other."31

Mr. Justice Douglas attempts a distinction in Lanza by asserting that
no final award has been made in Lanza, when there was such a final award
in Magnolia. Apparently, Mr. Justice Douglas is attempting to draw the
classical distinction between litigated and unlitigated matters at common
law in relation to res judicata. But the payments made under a Workmen's
Compensation Act are not voluntary payments. They are paid because there is
a statutory duty to pay them. If either party is not satisfied with the
statutory allowance it is true that he may ask for an adjudication of a
doubtful question by following the provisions of the statute. If an award
subsequently is made, it is made because the adjudicating agency finds that
the statute is applicable. If payments are made, without dispute, because
both parties are satisfied with the terms and applicability of the statute,
does it follow that such payments may be disregarded for any legal purpose?
If, in a case like McCartir, an additional award may be made in a second
state surely no one will deny that credit must be allowed for payments made
in the first state-whether made under a formal award or through simple
compliance with the statute. Such an assertion in Lanza brings to mind the
words of Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Magnolia ".

.

. I do not agree

with the view that the full faith and credit clause is to be enforced 'only
if the outcome pleases us.' ,,2 Full faith and credit should be as much of a
bar in one case as in the other." Mr. Justice Douglas' attempted distinction
between these two cases is unnecessary and confusing. A was not making
a claim against B under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Arkansas.
The added question of whether C is a "third person" who may be
sued in spite of the workmen's compensation payment seems to be more
determinative of the real issue in the case. A recovery based upon a
workmen's compensation statute is a recovery arising out of the relationship
of employer and employee. No rights except those arising out of the
employer-employee relationship are concluded by a workmen's compensation
award. Thus, an injury to an employee caused by a third person, for
81
82

See note 25 supra at 437.
See note 25 supra at 447.

8'A footnote at 349 U.S. 408, 420 (1955) says, "The dissent agrees with the Court that the
Court of Appeals misapplied Magnolia to the facts of the case." If C is included within the Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri, Magnolia is entitled to more weight. It is surprising that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter accepted Mr. Justice Douglas' distinction between litigated and unlitigated
as it related to payments under Workmen's Compensation.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

example, a motorist who carelessly drives his automobile over a sidewalk
and into a building under construction and makes an employee fall for
some distance commits a tort against the employee. His liability will be no
less because the employee was injured in the scope and course of his employment and may be entitled to some recovery under workmen's compensation.
Assuming that the employee is paid the statutory amount under a compensation act, that payment will entitle the employer to become subrogated
to the claim the employee has against the third person but the employee's
claim against the third person is not diminished. Nor should it be diminished,
because the third person and the employer are neither joint nor concurrent
tort feasors. But there is some possibility that a general contractor and a subcontractor are joint and concurrent causes of the industrial injury of the
employee. If there is but one claim to which each special employer has contributed, the claimant may not recover more than once. But whether this tort
has been committed by a "third person" or the injury has come under circumstances for which a statute makes only an "employer" liable must be
resolved by the law of a single state. Will that question be answered by the
application of the law of Arkansas 4 or the law of Missouri? In the words
of Shakespeare, "That is the question." Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter answer the question differently.
The forum is Arkansas. At the outset, the forum has the right to ask
why this problem may not be treated as a local problem. There was no
contract of employment entered into in Arkansas-the status of employeremployee between A and B was a continuing one when A performed his
duties in Arkansas. But duties arising out of that relationship were
performed in Arkansas and the employee was subjected to the risks
included within the compulsory coverage law of Arkansas. The injured
employee, A, was taken from the state of Arkansas shortly after his injury
so that the need for medical treatment was kept at a minimum. A different
injury may well have made a transfer of the patient impossible and the
interests of the State of Arkansas may well be served by making the compensation statute applicable. Possible support of dependents of the injured
party was not likely because Missouri was the home state, but the Act is
equally applicable to an unmarried worker. In the light o[ decided cases, it
is not reasonable to assert that Arkansas could not apply its Workmen's
Compensation Act to the claim of A against B-if it was the first forum
asked so to do. 5 But it was not the first to be asked and payments already
have been made under the compensation act of Missouri. Thus the discussion by the court as to the possible applicability of the Arkansas statute is
" Although the employee is restricted in his rights against his employer to the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Arkansas, ARK. STAT. § 81-1301 (1947), he is under no restriction as to
"third persons." Id. § 81-1340. See The Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 273 S.W. 2d 28 (Ark. 1954).
" See note 5 supra.
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irrelevant. No claim is made under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Arkansas, to which C is admittedly a stranger. The only reason why Arkansas
may not permit a common law recovery by A against C is because the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri is a constitutional obstacle to the
use of local law by the forum of Arkansas."0 The suit in Tort is brought
by A against C.
Pacific Employers carried the suggestion that the Massachusetts statute
could not be used, contrary to the public policy of California, because Congress had not included acts or statutes in the implementation clause for the
full faith and credit provisions of article IV. That condition was changed
by the Statute of 1948.3" In the light of the balance of the decision in
Pacific Employers favoring local public policy over the statute of Massachusetts, that suggestion does not seem to be important. Bradford Electric v.
Clapper seems to be more nearly in point and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
his dissent says the court is squarely faced with the Clapper problem, and
to make the interest of Arkansas prevail over that of Missouri would require
that Clapper be explicitly overruled.3"
What makes Mr. Justice Frankfurter so positive in his statement is not
clear. Clapperappears to hold that a Federal Court, exercising jurisdiction on
a diversity of citizenship basis and making a decision, therefore, as a neutral
forum in place of New Hampshire must, under full faith and credit,
accept the workmen's compensation statute of Vermont as a bar to the
application of the New Hampshire workmen's compensation statute. The
reason given was that the parties involved entered into their contract of
employment in Vermont, Vermont was the place of regular employment and
the employee was casually employed in New Hampshire at the time of his
injury. The net effect of the decision was to send the injured employe back
to Vermont to make his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Vermont. If the basis for distinction between Pacific Employers and Clapper
is the temporary nature of the foreign state employment, neither these cases
nor related cases have put any emphasis upon this point. The court in
Clapper may well have felt that the plaintiff was asserting her common
law right to sue in tort. Indeed, the foreign employment in Pacific Employers
was affirmatively stated to be temporary. In Alaska Packers there was to
be little or no employment in California, the performance of the entire contract was to be in Alaska. Most important, in all of these cases reviewed
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lanza the competition was between workmen's
compensation statutes when there was no question that all the A's and B's
involved were covered by the statutes.
a' See note 10 supra.
s' See note 6 supra.
as 349 U.S. 408, 421 (1955).
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The question here, to repeat, is whether Arkansas may apply its own
internal or local law in the case of A versus C, or does the Federal Constitution forbid? If A's claim against C is merged in A's claim against B, it is
necessary to inquire as to whether the claim of A against B has been satisfied.
By the law of Arkansas C is a "third person" against whom A may assert a
claim for his injuries. 9 Again, according to Mr. Justice Douglas ". .. we
have the naked question whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes
Missouri's statute a bar to Arkansas' common law remedy." 4 If A may
sue C, on a common law theory in Arkansas, how may the statute of Missouri
be used to prevent Arkansas from giving relief which, according to Arkansas
law is appropriate? The answer, if there is an answer, must be that B and C
are so identified under the law of Missouri that the recovery by A against B
in Missouri exempts C from further liability to A.
The majority opinion in Lanza, reversing the Court of Appeals, held
that the full faith and credit clause did not bar recovery by A against C
under the law of Arkansas. Through intervention in Arkansas B and his
indemnity company were given a lien on the judgment in favor of A as
against C. Thus, the legal effect of payment by B to A, under the laws of
Missouri, was recognized. The majority goes on to say:
"Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive, if she chooses,
and enforce it as she pleases within her borders. Once that policy is extended
into other states, different considerations come into play. Arkansas can adopt
Missouri's policy if she likes, or, as the Pacific Employers Insurance Co.
case teaches, she may supplement it or displace it with another, insofar as
remedies within her boundaries are concerned. Were it otherwise, the State
where the injury occurred would be powerless to provide any remedies or
safeguards to non-resident employees working within its borders. We do not
think the Full Faith '4and
Credit Clause demands that subserviency from the
1
State of the injury."
The painful fact is that Arkansas has not provided by statute for any
special protection for A against C. The Pacific Employers case is not in
point and the public policy arguments of equality for the home state statute
against the foreign statute, which otherwise would be used, has no relevance
because the Lanza case does not involve the competition of workmen's compensation statutes of two states. Mr. Justice Douglas said as much when
he declared the question before the court was as naked as it is now embarrassing to write it.4 2 May the common law policy of the forum override the
statutory policy of a sister state? Perhaps the Clapper case teaches that the
answer is in the negative, although the plaintiff's case was framed under the
New Hampshire Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Act.
" See note 34 supra, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas at 349 U.S. 408, 410 (1955).

40 349
't

U.S. 408, 411 (1955).
Id. at 413-414.

42

See note 40 supra.
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The New Hampshire statute contained the somewhat unusual provision that,
after the injury, the claimant could waive the workmen's compensation
recovery given under the statute and pursue instead a common-law recovery
in tort.4" The claimant, having so elected, was nevertheless required by the
United States Supreme Court to abandon the remedy of the New Hampshire
law and to use instead the exclusive statutory remedy of Vermont,4 4 by
which the claimant's decedent on making his contract of employment in
Vermont had elected to be bound. The majority in Clapper,speaking through
Mr. Justice Brandeis, declared that such a result was required under full
faith and credit. But Mr. Chief Justice Stone, concurring, states that the
Vermont law was applied in New Hampshire on principles of comity.
Do the cases cited 4 5 actually establish more than the prqposition that the
forum is free to choose the law of either state, so long as there are substantial contacts with the law of the state so chosen? The constitutional test
then is more properly due process instead of full faith and credit.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter apparently prefers to reach the same result,
to make the forum's choice of Arkansas law a proper one, by way of the
conflict of laws route. Assuming that it is established, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has assumed to be true, that the problem to be solved involves multistate contacts, the forum is supposed to reject local law and to employ the
second body of law found in the forum-namely, conflict of laws. According to Professor Lorenzen, the problem then is subject to primary characterization,4" i.e., finding into what broad field of the law this problem may be
said to fall. By the Lorenzen view, the forum will use its own categories.
The claim of A against C, under Arkansas local law is not based upon a
statute. Therefore, the approach will be the one known at common4aw, and
for personal injuries the appropriate category is Tort.
Next the problem must be tied up with the law of a particular jurisdiction. There should be some logical as well as legal basis for this identification. In Tort, the proposition is accepted without much dispute that the
place of injury provides the connecting factor.4 This makes the law of
Arkansas applicable and, if this is true, there is no problem of conflict of
laws. It is now observable that the basic premise of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that it is a multi-state problem was fallacious and the problem should have
been denominated at the outset as local. If, by the law of the forum, this
problem cannot be one of workmen's compensation because a general con"N.H. SEss. LAWS 1911, c. 163, §§ 2,4.
"Vt. Acts 1915, No. 164, Sec. 7.
"5Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1950); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
"50 YALE L. J. 743, 743 (1941).
,Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L. Q. lEv. 483 (1931).
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tractor is not bound by that Arkansas Act, the only other category in use
locally is Tort. Thus, if Mr. Justice Frankfurter wishes to characterize this
problem as one in workmen's compensation, then he must use the category
employed in Missouri, or the locus. The choice remaining, then, is to admit
error or to require the forum to accept the categories used in the other jurisdiction. It is doubtful, under the implications of Lanza, that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter subscribes to the Lorenzen view of characterization according to
the categories of the forum. The Frankfurter characterization makes this a
problem in workmen's compensation and the connecting factor is the place of
the contract of principal employment. The law of Missouri thus becomes
relevant for the solution of the problem.
The third step in the process is to apply the law of Missouri to the
fact situation before the court. At this point, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's difficulty increases. The law of Missouri has not been found by the court below.
Surveying the case material available in Missouri, there is still a gap in
the information which Mr. Justice Frankfurter believes he must possess.
There is case material in Missouri which indicates that A may not sue C at
common-law because B and C are identified under the Workmen's Compensation Act as parties obliged to insure A against the risk of industrial
harm.4" Likewise, Mr. Justice Frankfurter understands that a person subject
to statutory liability cannot be sued as a third party.49 But the case material
has not made clear to him that a prime contractor who has not made a
contract in Missouri or who was not performing in Missouri, as he believes
to be true of this defendant C, will be bound by the statutes of Missouri.
Is Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggesting that a question of legislative jurisdiction and due process is present? Until that doubt is resolved, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter believes that the Supreme Court cannot solve the question
because they do not have the law of Missouri to apply to the facts. But he
anticipates that if the proper tribunal, at a lower level, makes a finding
that C is not bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri, there
will be no constitutional problem before the court, since C is liable to A only
at common-law in Missouri and Arkansas will not be forbidden, by the
requirement of giving full faith and credit to a sister state statute, to apply
the local law. But if the proper lower court finds that C is bound by the
workmen's compensation statutes of Missouri, full faith and credit may, or
may not, require the forum to reject its local law. That question will be
settled when the United States Supreme Court decides whether or not
Clapper is overruled. Thus, one "readily available alternative short of over" Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W. 2d 153 (1938), which is quoted on p. 424, and
Mo. REV. STAT. 1949 quoted on pp. 424425, to establish that prime contractors are subject to liability under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Statute.
- 349 U.S. 408, 425 (1955).
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ruling Clapper"5 probably requires a finding of fact that the Missouri
statute has no bearing upon the problem. There has not been, to date, any
suggestion in Supreme Court cases that the common-law of one state must be
given full faith and credit in another.51 If the finding is that A may not
recover from C in Missouri under the Workmen's Compensation Act of that
state, because C is under no statutory duty to A, judgment should be given
for C. Such a conclusion, under the Lorenzen formula is only tentative.
The next step in the Lorenzen formula requires that a review be made
of the tentative judgment in the light of the public policy of the forum.
There is case material in the forum, Arkansas, which says that C may be
sued by A, under the local law of the forum, as a "third person."5 " This is
a difference in law. Mere differences in law do not equal differences in
public policy.5 3 There must be something fundamentally different or something which goes contrary to the mores of the people of the forum, although
tolerable in the locus. Gambling is an illustration frequently used.54 The
review of the tentative judgment in the light of the public policy of the
forum may, however, lead only to one conclusion, i.e., that the law of the
loci must be rejected because it is contrary to the public policy of the
forum to give effect to such a law. The cases do not authorize an affinnative
substitution of the law of the forum for the solution of the problem.5
Undesirable as it may seem to the court of the forum, the application of the
Lorenzen techniques to the solution of this problem leads to the conclusion
that A may not recover. The result for this case, unfortunately, is the
logical consequence of the primary characterization according to the law
of the loci instead of the law of the forum. It does not provide an "alternative" to a consideration of Clapper.
If a contrary finding is made as to the law of Missouri so as to require
a holding that C is liable to A, under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Missouri, then Clapper is the constitutional obstacle under full faith and
credit to a recovery by A against C. This is an answer to Mr. Justice Douglas
who has supposed that due process had been satisfied when the forum used
its own law because the forum also was the place of injury. Precedent does
not support the view of Mr. Justice Douglas that due process is the only
relevant constitutional requirement when there is a common-law policy of
the forum in conflict with the statutory policy of an affected sister state.
Full faith and credit, so applied, will have a double effect. First, if the
50

Id.at 422.
1 supra.

5 See note

"' See note 34 supra.

" Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
" See note 18 supra,particularly Ciampittiello v. Campitello.
" Slater v. Mexican National R. Company, 194 U.S. 120 (1904) ; Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438,
46 N.E. 2d 509 (1943).
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A versus C problem being solved in the forum has been classified as local,
the United States Constitution requires a reclassification into Conflict of
Laws. Second, the statute of the sister state, again by constitutional compulsion, becomes the proper law for the solution of the legal problem.
Related to this second effect, and an important part thereof is this: that the
constitutional compulsion to select and use the law of a sister state is likewise a prohibition against a review of the tentative judgment in the light
of other public policy of the forum. The purely local law of the forum is
completely displaced through constitutional compulsion."
What it appears that Mr. Justice Frankfurter seeks to do is to avoid
Clapper on a special finding of fact. He hopes to demonstrate on the facts
that C, the prime contractor, is not brought within the provisions of the
workmen's compensation statute of Missouri because C's contract with B,
the subcontractor, has no contacts with Missouri. In the absence of local
contacts, the legislature of Missouri lacks jurisdiction over the contract of
B and C. This being the condition of the law, the statute has no relevance
and there is no basis for the demand that full faith and credit be given to
the Missouri statute in Arkansas. Thus construed, the problem is no longer
one of full faith and credit. The principal case then does not impinge on
Clapper, and the holding of the majority will neither affirm nor deny the
validity of Clapper. On this state of facts, it is difficult if not impossible
to observe any difference of opinion between the majority and the dissenters
as to the law of Clapper. Certainly the majority cannot be charged by the
dissent with overruling Clapper.
The attack of Mr. Justice Frankfurter continues so as to disassociate
the problem in Arkansas from the Workmen's Compensation Act of Arkansas
by proof that C is a "third party" in Arkansas. Again, the principal case
will not impinge on Clapper. The problem has been reduced by his reasoning
to a conflict of the common-law policies of two states with which problem
Clapper has never been identified. With problems of full faith and credit
thus eliminated, all that remains is the problem of due process in selection of
relevant law. On this there is no discernible difference of view between the
forces of Mr. Justice Douglas and those of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Taking
away from the problem all aspects of full faith and credit, the problem will
produce an identical solution whether the approach is that of local law or
conflict of laws. Eliminating, as both sides do, the applicability of workmen's
compensation there is only one primary characterization possible under the
traditions of the common law." That characterization will be in the field
" First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952) ; Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) ; Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v.
Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938) ; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
"' Unless, of course, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is told by the lower court what apparently he does
not expect to learn, namely that C is included within the provisions of the Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Act.
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of Torts. By following common-law tradition once more, the choice of the
connecting factor will be place of injury. If by some extraordinary choice

of connecting factor the place from which the employee was sent out on
the job could be it-namely, Missouri, the result is not likely to be any
different. There are sufficient contacts with each state to put the forum in
the position of making a choice between them free of the risk of being

charged in the Supreme Court of the United States with an arbitrary choice of
law in violation of the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.5"
Conclusion
Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, as 'vell, teach that full faith
and credit will not require a forum to displace its own Workmen's Compensation Act for a similar act of a sister state or territory when the problem
presents relatively the same legal contacts with both jurisdictions. Clapper
teaches that a conflict between the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state
of principal employment and the common-law of the forum, which is also
the place of injury, or a Workmen's Compensation Act of the forum which
permits an employee, after his injury, to elect to follow a common-law
remedy will result in a Supreme Court order, under full faith and credit to
reject the application of the local law of the forum and to remit the claimant
to his administrative remedies of the state of his employment, under an
exclusive act by which he is irrevocably bound. Magnolia teaches that an
award made under a Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of injury is
res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit in the state of principal
employment, in which a claim is made for the higher benefits provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Act of the forum. McCartin,teaches that if
the award made by the state in which injury occurs is described by that state
as a partial award with rights remaining in the place of principal employment, the partial award does not equal res judicata of the entire claim, and
except for credit for payments already made, will not call for the application
of the full faith and credit clause. Carroll v. La-za teaches that a problem
involving a common-law claim of an employee of a subcontractor against a
general contractor brought in the state in which the employee suffered an
injury can become very complicated when the employee is covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Acts of the two states involved. The requirement of
full faith and credit for statutes of a sister state, sometimes thought to be
a part of Constitutional Law from time immemorial and asserted with more
certainty since the Act of 1948 amended the implementation statute, will
mean no more than it did in Alaska Packers where competing statutes are
involved, or in Pacific Employers where, again, the amended statute was not
" See Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
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before the court. The application of the statute thus selected by the forum
will be reviewable only under due process. If the forum can find that no
Workmen's Compensation Act is involved because general contractors make
their contracts elsewhere than at the place of injury or the place of principal
employment and so are not included within the relevant statutes, judgments
of state courts based on common-law principles are reviewable only under
due process. Due process, in that it permits judicial review, will be as much
of a restraint upon the free choice of the forum whether the forum wishes
to classify the problem as one solvable by local law or one solvable by
Conflict of Laws. Due process being satisfied by the use of a reasonable basis
for the choice, it makes no difference whether local law or Conflict of Laws
is used by the forum. This is the Q.E.D. offered for the problem of
Carrollv. Lanza.

